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A B S T R A C T
High penetration of distributed energy resources will lead to further fragmentation of the power sector,
both in the services offered and its value chain. Successful business models will be those that are able to
create new products, establish more efﬁcient pricing mechanisms and monetize services, which
customers could no longer receive free of charge. The principles of the ‘sharing economy’ could be applied
to manage the fragmentation of the industry while keeping transaction costs in check.
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access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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High penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) could
result in two market-altering outcomes that the industry and
regulators cannot ignore (KAPSARC, 2016). First, that increased
levels of DERs may result in regulation and policy becoming more
local, with increasing fragmentation, both in the services offered
and the power industry value chain. Second, that vertical
unbundling may be augmented with a teasing apart of the
elements of electricity supply and allow the emergence of
platforms on which any resulting new products and services can
be traded.
In this article, we try to envisage what new business models
might arise by revisiting existing models in the electricity sector.
The risk for incumbent utilities is the ongoing emergence of
innovative new technologies, which may destabilize the industry
with large sunk costs and where infrastructure is already in place.
We suggest that utilities may evolve their business models and
learn to compete in bilateral, platform-based markets that
incorporate some features of what is known as the “sharing
economy.”
DERs are relatively small, geographically disseminated sources
of energy that are connected directly to the distribution system,
rather than through the bulk transmission system. They operate in
parallel with the electric utility or standalone units. Power can be
sold back to the grid where permitted by regulation. Among the
most widely used DERs technologies are photovoltaic (PV) panels.E-mail address: Rolando.fuentes@kapsarc.org (R. Fuentes-Bracamontes).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2016.10.006
1040-6190/ã 2016 King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center. Published
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).PV generation is intermittent, dispersed, and uncertain (MIT,
2015).
We use the term “business model” to describe the way an
organization delivers value to customers, encourages customers to
pay for value, and converts those payments to proﬁt (Teece, 2010;
Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010; Zott et al., 2011). The
business models of today’s utilities are largely constrained by what
regulation allows them to do. We will imagine in this exercise that
electric utilities are able to set their business model without
requiring regulatory approval – after all, electricity markets are
opening up, creating demand for many different goods and
services.
There are some limitations to the arguments we put forward.
The ﬁrst, obviously, is that no one can accurately predict the future.
The second is that, because electric power markets are so
idiosyncratic, it is not realistic to have a one-size-ﬁts-all business
model. Our aim is to provide a general framework and to identify
business characteristics that are applicable to a variety of areas.
2. Business model
In many markets, the prevailing business model for electric
utilities is a cost-plus structure, in which the utilities pass on the
majority of their costs plus a return on their capital investment to
customers as a variable rate ($/kWh). The objective is to operate in
a cost minimization fashion, and the model sustains itself with
further capital investment, sales growth, and sustainable prices.
This has led to a business model where adding new infrastructure
is the bread and butter of utilities’ revenues. But can we still expect
future utilities to operate within this framework, given massive
investment requirements and lower sales? With lower sales, will by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
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companies themselves need to ﬁnd a new way to grow, and
regulators need to ensure that the ﬁxed-cost element of the system
is not too great, as this would increase prices.
One obvious option for a utility is to cannibalize its core
business with afﬁliate companies that provide DERs. Utilities
themselves can be holding companies, where new, independent
sister units cannibalize the legacy utility part and these sister ﬁrms
help ﬁnance the holding company. However, it is unclear whether
it is sustainable to plow earnings from the new businesses into a
losing legacy segment. In other words, would this be proﬁt-
maximizing or, rather, a strategy to delay the inevitable proﬁt
decay?
We suggest that there are other alternatives, though. A utility
does not only offer energy to its customers, but also spare
generation capacity, ramping ﬂexibility, operating reserves, ancil-
lary services, etc. Customers do not value all these items in
themselves since they do not see them or think about them. In the
next section, we will consider alternative roles for the utility based
on these attributes.
2.1. Unbundling services
New technologies make it clearer that electricity is a
multidimensional commodity. The most straightforward dimen-
sion is “energy,” determined by the amount of energy delivered,
the timing, and location. But we should also consider the reason for
using energy, such as charging a battery, running a fridge, or
watching TV, end use – cooling and heating – and its reliability, i.e.,
the probability that supply would be available. For example,
different people may have different thresholds of comfort or
convenience, which are indirect services provided by electricity
suppliers. Other intangibles can also be taken account of, such as
the value of emissions not emitted, or even the value of non-
consumption of energy for the system, a term coined as Negawatts.
The important feature for business models is that DERs
eliminate opportunities for implicit cross-subsidy between these
attributes, exposing the presence of potential free riding among
customers and making it difﬁcult to lump all services into a single
tariff. Successful new business models will ﬁnd a way to monetize
the value of each of these previously described attributes,
separately or combined, according to the consumer’s preferences,
without increasing transaction costs.
2.2. The sharing economy
The value proposition of the sharing economy is the use of the
Internet to bring together people with underused assets and others
that might like to use them, or rent them, in a timely manner; with
low transaction costs, as information from both parties becomes
more transparent through the use of a platform. It is also known as
collaborative consumption or the collaborative economy, the
asset-light lifestyle, or the access economy. The cornerstone of this
concept is the existence of underutilized ﬁxed assets and,
therefore, excess capacity.
Experience from the sharing economy can shed light, as some of
its principles are applicable to the power sector.
1) In the organization of the electricity sector, underutilized assets
are the norm rather than the exception. This is because grid
investments are dictated by the need to meet peak load
requirements that occur in very short periods of time
throughout the year. This underutilization raises concerns on
the best way to cover grid maintenance costs and to ﬁnance
expansion.2) New technologies in the electricity sector will create nested
markets to which some principles from the sharing economy
can be applied. A multiple-sided market is a meeting place of a
number of agents that interact through an intermediary or a
platform (Rochet and Tirole, 2004). In these types of markets, an
intermediary captures the value of the interaction between user
groups, and network externalities may lead to one of these
being charged a non-cost-reﬂective price (Weiller and Pollit,
2013). The distribution platform can act in similar ways to this.
3) The analogy with the sharing economy is relevant because
technological advances have led to a world of distributed
autonomy in which no single entity has full information or is
able to bring about collective coordination. However, individual
agents’ actions affect the rest through the grid.
4) Representative ﬁrms from the sharing economy act in parallel to
the formal sector, such as taxis or hotels, and in overregulated
sectors. The electric power sector can also be characterized as
overregulated. Most DERs operate behind the meter, alongside
the formal power sector.
5) Thresholds are important. Incumbent ﬁrms and regulators have
not challenged new entrants’ behavior until they have achieved
a noticeable market share. The same logic applies to incumbent
utilities and regulators with a growing number of prosumers
(See Adjali et al., 2016). Utilities have accommodated small-
scale generators for decades, but it has only been recently that
DERs have made greater inroads that threaten a utility’s
revenues.
2.3. How to price unbundled services? An example of risk
There is an inherent dilemma in the sharing economy in the
deﬁnition of products and prices. This is because products are
based on spare capacity, but in economics prices should reﬂect
scarcity. So the deﬁnition of products and prices is not
straightforward. We argue that unbundling services in the power
sector will reveal what elements of attributes are spare and what
are scarce.
Let us illustrate this with the example of reliability in domestic
markets, viewed as an unbundled service. We know that in the
future a growing share of generation would be at low or zero
marginal cost. This would mean traditional utilities would end up
having unused capacity for long periods of time. That, paradoxi-
cally, would make this dispatchable capacity more important, as
they could act as suppliers of last resort.
So, even if every household is completely self-sufﬁcient, these
consumers would still ﬁnd value in staying connected to the grid
because utilities can offer options to provide coverage. If utilities
are to leverage their infrastructure as insurance, they will need to
change the way they charge customers – for example, by redeﬁning
who pays what, changing the basis of tariffs or the frequency of
payments. A health insurance company’s business model, for
example, is based on healthy people ﬁnancing the treatment of ill
people.
The way forward for the utility could be to charge a ﬁxed price
to customers for them to retain the option of access to back up. In
one version of this alternative, customers could pay a one-time
access fee for a ﬁxed amount of energy per year. Though the
tendency is to have more real-time decisions with smart metering,
in effect incrementally increasing the frequency of transactions,
this proposal would, counterintuitively, decrease the number of
transactions by charging a membership scheme, similar to Netﬂix,
for example, instead of volumetric rates.
There is at least one caveat to this argument, though. Contracts
for streaming services such as Netﬂix are feasible since there is no
rivalry in consumption in their service. In other words, streaming
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same. By contrast, electricity is a rival good in consumption,
although it can still be argued that not all of a utility’s customers
will need backup at the same time. This is the same argument as
saying that not all people would claim on their health insurance or
cash in their bank accounts at the same time.
2.4. Value chain
Another example of the increasing fragmentation of the electric
power industry, driven by the penetration of DERs, is shown in
proposals to create a distributed system platform (DSP). The
distribution operator business may move from pure asset
management to managing a portfolio of services, such as energy
transport, access services, market facilitation services, and system
operator services (Ruester et al., 2014). With such a platform, new
entrants can offer products and services, via their own bilateral
markets, such as home management systems, demand response,
and electric vehicle platforms.
The idea of unbundling the value chain is not new. Vertically
integrated utilities exist to reduce transaction costs. The logic of
past electricity reforms, dating from the 1990s, was that segments
in the value chain would be separated to allow greater market
participation. Although this fragmentation of the value chain
would increase transaction costs, the argument was that private
participation and competition would make these activities more
efﬁcient and offset additional costs.
The creation of a distribution platform is one of the most
notable aspects of New York’s electricity reform, Reforming the
Energy Vision (REV). REV combines this with transparency on the
valuation of products and services. The importance of this initiative
is that New York is set to be the ﬁrst to codify a new market design
and standards, in goals for 2030. If successful, the developments
there may prove to be a blueprint for other states and countries.
New York’s REV consist of two tracks. Track 1 focuses on the role of
distribution utilities. This includes the deployment and manage-
ment of DERs, customer engagement and wholesale market issues
that may arise. Track 2 covers the regulatory changes to the
ratemaking process, incentive structure, and market design (NYS,
2014, 2015).Fig. 1. Business model and3. Regulatory cycle
In this section we discuss the dynamics between business
models and regulatory adaptation. The question here is whether
future electricity business models respond to new and existing
regulations, or whether business models develop faster than the
regulations and thus force regulators to adapt and accommodate
the new models.
We draw analogies from the sharing economy to provide a
framework for analysis. The most relevant segment for DERs may
be the domestic market. In this market, households can operate
these technologies in parallel to the formal sector – behind the
meter – in a similar way to some services in the sharing economy.
Also in the domestic market, the frontier between the personal and
professional sectors is blurred: a household’s main activity is
probably not energy trading – similar to, for example, an on-
demand Uber driver whose main occupation is probably not
driving a taxi.
The cycle begins with utilities’ business models being
considerably constrained by what regulations allow them to do.
For example, the rate of return converts a utility’s business model
predominantly into one based on infrastructure. But the status quo
can be disrupted by technological innovations that alter the
landscape. The experience of Uber illustrates this point. In a
response to this sort of development, new business models reﬂect
the elements of the emerging technology.
After such a disruption, regulation no longer responds to the
main features of the new business models and falls behind sector
developments. Regulators then adapt the legal framework to cope
with the altered elements of the new technologies. Examples
include changes made to local regulations to accommodate taxi
ﬁrms like Uber and Lyft or property renting company Airbnb.
Finally, other jurisdictions facing similar disruptions tend to follow
the precedents of the ﬁrst mover regulator. This has been observed
in the power sector, where electricity reform in the United
Kingdom became the standard model for deregulation and other
countries followed the main elements of their reforms.
The dominant strategy for new entrants, in this case, would be
to quickly grab market share in order to lock in their new
technology, and to push regulators to take account of their new
business practices by adopting the emerging standard regulation. regulatory dynamics.
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because they are dealing with homogenous regulations across
their main markets. While this would be beneﬁcial for ﬁrms,
regulators would potentially be contributing to locking in
technologies. If regulators fail to keep pace with innovations in
the industry and act to prevent this, they risk slowing further
innovation.
The schematic in Fig. 1 is more complicated, though.
Technological innovations are not neutral. In stage 2, the
technological innovation that changes the landscape may be
subsidy or policy driven, as some would argue is the case with
renewable technology. In other words, regulation can proactively
allow for innovation rather than be reactive. We also assume that a
new business model would be based on technological innovation,
stage 3, but it is entirely possible that the innovation in question
could simply be taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage. The
response of the regulator might not be automatic. Regulators may
decide, for example, not to adapt to the business model of the
innovator, but to deregulate the entire sector to eliminate the
source of the arbitrage.
Firms, on their part, may further decide to self-regulate in order
to pre-empt regulators from blocking the source of the arbitrage.
Widespread adoption of DERs, however, could increase system
risks and transfer costs to other customers in the absence of an
organized market. So if the regulatory framework fails to keep pace
with the changing nature of the electric power system, large
inefﬁciencies could result. The dilemma for policymakers and
regulators is to ﬁnd the balance between what can be left to grow
as “uncoordinated” markets, and what needs to be given ﬁxed
limits, via regulation.
3.1. Local energy policies
The ability of DERs to deliver resources when they are most
needed deﬁnes their value. This value depends on how well
operational characteristics align with peak loads in a distribution
area. The impact is thus mostly local. If DERs were to be become the
dominant technology, this would imply that energy policy can
transition from being stabilized at national levels to more “local”Table 1
Modules an options.
Modules Options Comments
Coordination
Transmission and
distribution
Merge ISO/DSO, Keep them separated,
Super ISO, Super DSO,
Could either disaggregat
(transmission and distrib
Who operates? Utility itself, independent entity, no
coordinator
Utility may be able to exe
prevent this.
Failures Utility, extra service, independent Clear assignment of role
resource of last resort to
Network
Rates Fixed vs. ﬂexible Fixed rates will beneﬁt u
Access Constrained vs. open There are two aspects to
discriminatory access is 
Transactions
Products MWh, MW, NWh, emissions Power is a multidimensio
establish a market for po
incumbent utilities as th
Type 1 Bilateral, over the counter Issues to consider are tra
bring about more transa
end would be an empiri
Type 2 Wholesale or retail? This would bring a gove
Responsibilities of federa
Generation
Ownership Network operator may own
generation capacity
Some stakeholders advoc
advantageous for them.energy policies. Governance of energy would be an important
aspect since operations and responsibilities can lie within federal,
state, and municipal levels.
The locational value of DERs depends on two variables: the
current infrastructure position and the demand proﬁle of the
location. Distributed energy resources have different response
times, ramp speeds, periods during which individual customer
reductions can be sustained, and limits on utilization. The amount
of excess capacity depends on the initial conditions, or on the
ability to reduce demand through energy efﬁciency measures. The
magnitude and urgency of the distribution investment deferred or
avoided depends on future demand and whether deferred
investments are incremental or not. The peak load patterns of
the distribution area depend on the customer mix, energy
efﬁciency, and demand shifting capabilities.
Some authors have posited that policies are modular con-
structions – elements that can be designed independently, one
from another and connected through interfaces (Baldwin, 2008;
Dubois, 2009; Wilson, 2002). For example, for the management of
electricity transmission, networks can be designed independently
of wholesale markets. We argue that in the case of DERs, new
modules would encompass network, coordination, and generation.
Among the key questions to be addressed in such modules are:
 What activities will be regulated?
 How can market operators ensure DERs provide the greatest
value to the system and preserve system reliability?
 How will system operations change?
 How will DERs affect long-term planning?
 What are the roles and responsibilities of third party market
entrants?
 Should regulated utilities facilitate and manage competitive
distributed energy markets?
Table 1 identiﬁes modules and potential alternative policy
questions. The outcome of the modules’ interactions depends on
how well each design aligns with the other, i.e., a variant of one
module ﬁts best with a speciﬁc variant of another module. This
does not necessarily mean the “ﬁrst best” design for each module ise or aggregate the platforms, for example in terms of location, function
ution), etc.
rcise its market power by operating the platform. Regulation would be needed to
s and procedures in case of failures must be established. The utility can act as a
 back-up the system.
tilities while variable rates would beneﬁt intermittent ﬂow from new entrants.
 consider: Access to the physical system and access to data. Open and non-
a necessary condition for new entrants to succeed.
nal product. Most of its attributes are intangible, so regulation would be needed to
sitive and negative externalities. The enforcement of markets would beneﬁt
ese are products that they can provide more easily.
nsaction costs and penalties for non-compliance. A more fragmented market will
ction costs, but market creation in each segment can increase efﬁciencies. At the
cal question whether beneﬁts exceed costs.
rnance question as regulators are not the same for wholesale and retail.
l or local governments may overlap.
ate that distribution utilities should not own generation assets as this would be
20 R. Fuentes-Bracamontes / The Electricity Journal 29 (2016) 16–20compatible with the “ﬁrst best” design of the next or, indeed, the
system overall. This creates the possibility of a range of policy
templates.
4. Conclusion
A high penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) in the
power sector will lead to further fragmentation, both in the
services offered and its value chain. The “local” component of
energy policies could become increasingly important. Successful
business models would need to ﬁnd the way to monetize the
intangible services provided together with energy provision. We
suggest that the sharing economy can provide a good framework
for analysis of how this is to be carried out.
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